Tag Archives: mitigation

Future Threats

Aside from hoax attacks, where credible threats occur based on purposeful counter-intelligence efforts of terrorists, I suspect large-scale events to be the modus operandi of terrorists in the next decade. According to LaFree, Yang, and Crenshaw (2009), anti-U.S. terrorists have ample intent on attacking the U.S. on our soil; however, this would be a huge and logistically complicated undertaking. For this reason, any future organized act of terror on U.S. soil will be designed to be significant, causing extreme loss of life or toppling a significant structure or both.

Biologic weapons would be the choice for terrorists who wished to inflict harm to the greatest amount of people, though releasing biologic material lacks the sudden impact usually sought, and weaponized biologics are not easily grown or economical (Levitin, 2005). Chemical weapons are typically easier and cheaper to manufacture, though they lack effectiveness and tend to merely create a scare of equivalent magnitude of a hoax (Levitin, 2005). Aside from basic explosives, this leaves the radiologic threat, a threat that I believe, coupled with a significant target, will cause devastating effects not unlike 9/11.

A dirty bomb is a conventional explosive used to disseminate radiologic materials over an area. I foresee a coordinated attack on the financial districts of the U.S. using dirty bombs. The bombs would, first, cause physical destruction to the buildings causing immediate disruption of the financial sector of the U.S. economy, along with a large death toll. Second, the radiation dispersed over the area would cause difficulty in cleaning up the area, inhibiting recovery and further impacting the financial markets.

A law enforcement response to such an attack would certainly be large in scale. The local police department would be first to respond, along with state police, then the WMD Coordinator at the local FBI field office would be apprised of the situation. As responders start arriving on scene, personal radiation detectors would start to tone indicating the release of radiologic material. This further information would prompt the WMD Dictorate in Washington, D.C., to order a full asset response by the FBI and other federal terrorism partners (e.g. the Joint Terrorism Task Force). The response to this type of incident should be trained on in cooperative exercises involving all levels of law enforcement. Additionally, personal radiation detectors (and other detectors) should, at a minimum, be placed in police vehicles for early warning of environments immediately dangerous to life and health. Adequate training, equipment, and preparation are the only ways in which to prepare for responding to large-scale terrorist attacks.


LaFree, G., Yang, S., & Crenshaw, M. (2009). Trajectories of terrorism: Attack patterns of foreign groups that have targeted the United States, 1970-2004. Criminology & Public Policy, 8(3), 445-473. doi:10.1111/j.1745-9133.2009.00570.x

Levitin, H. W. (2005). Debunking myths: How law enforcement can help diffuse the public’s fear. On the Beat. Retrieved from http://www.adl.org/learn/columns/Levitin.asp

The Role of Federal Law Enforcement

The role of federal law enforcement has changed with the inception of the National Response Framework (NRF; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). In the past, according to the obsolete National Response Plan (NRP; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2004), the effort of the federal government was to support local efforts and only take charge if necessary or requested to do so by the responsible jurisdiction. The NRF furthers this goal. However, according to a recent U.S. Department of Justice (2010) report, federal law enforcement is ill-prepared to provide a robust and organized response to an act of terrorism on U.S. soil, save for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI).

For instance, assume that a small group of terrorists detonate a bomb, otherwise known as a ‘suitcase bomb’, designed to shower radiologic material over an area approximately 9 city blocks in downtown Los Angeles. What chain reaction, in regards to a law enforcement response, would this event trigger?

First, calls to 9-1-1 reporting a large explosion would trigger a local response by both the Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Office, along with other emergency services. As local assets begin arriving, hopefully they determine the large and possibly catastrophic nature of the event and advise their communications center to make the appropriate notifications. These notifications would be contingent on the preplanned incident action plans of each agency, which would, hopefully, open emergency operations centers (EOCs) for the City of Los Angeles, Los Angeles County, and the State of California. These EOCs would be responsible for making further notifications and coordinating the response with mutual aid agencies as well as state and federal assets. Common to most all preplans in the event of a suspected terrorist attack is the notification to the FBI’s Joint Terrorism Task Force, which is responsible, according to the Department of Justice (2010) report and the NRF, for coordinating all law enforcement and investigative activities of federal agencies (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).

A suitcase bomb is significant as it involves the spread of radiological materials that are harmful to humans. According to the Department of Justice (2010) report, the only federal law enforcement agency prepared to deal with such an event is the FBI. Thus, the FBI would be expected to offer expertise and specialized teams to the Los Angeles Police Department in a cooperative effort to begin law enforcement and investigative procedures as soon as possible.


U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2004). National response plan. Retrieved from http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nrp/nrp.pdf

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008). National response framework. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf

U.S. Department of Justice. (2010, May). Review of the department’s preparation to respond to a WMD incident (OIG Report# I-2010-004). Retrieved from http://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/e1004.pdf

Hacking Cyberterrorism

Although not particular to cyberterrorism, for this discussion I have chosen hacking as a type, or means, of cyberterrorism. Hacking covers virus loading and denial of service attacks, also. In order to carry out a cyberterrorism attack, it must be based on some sort of hacking. First, however, we must agree on the definitions of hacking and cyberterrorism. US Legal, a website dedicated to providing legal reference, broadly defines hacking as “intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access” (Computer hacking law & legal definition, n.d., para 1). Cyberterrorism is, according to Denning (2006):

…[H]ighly damaging computer-based attacks or threats of attack by non-state actors against information systems when conducted to intimidate or coerce governments or societies in pursuit of goals that are political or social. It is the convergence of terrorism with cyberspace, where cyberspace becomes the means of conducting the terrorist act. Rather than committing acts of violence against persons or physical property, the cyberterrorist commits acts of destruction or disruption against digital property. (p. 124)

Arguably, in order to use a computer system to do any of the above, it involves hacking, but without hacking, there can be no cyber- component to cyberterrorism, which leaves mere terrorism. Fortunately, using these definitions, there has never been a cyberterrorism attack ever in history (Brunst, 2008; Conway, 2011). Brunst (2008) goes further using the term terrorism to include the planning (and, even pre-planning) phases of an event. I disagree with this tact in scholarship. Brunst fails to provide the distinction between cybercrime and cyberterrorism. Thinking simply, having a Facebook account in order for ease of communication does not amount to meeting for coffee. Messaging a friend on Facebook and organizing a meeting does not constitute meeting for coffee. The act of two or more persons meeting for coffee is a conventional one, however it was planned. This is the same with terrorism. I argue that, although much planning and radicalization can occur using computer networking (e.g. Facebook, MySpace, general information websites, et al.), any terroristic act that stems from such organization would still be considered conventional terrorism unless the act, itself, is described as being technological in nature (Conway, 2011).

There is potential for a cyber-attack to generate fear, economic impact, and the loss of life. This is why we concentrate on security measures to ensure difficulty in accessing systems without proper credentialing, rapid identification and response to active intrusions and threats, and recovery techniques to identify and repair data, networks, and nodes that were involved. For this reason, networks are designed with human redundancy. Human redundancy, as Clarke (2005) explains, integrates human decision points within a technological operational structure in order to detect, indicate, explain, and correct an error. Additionally, infrastructure, a commonly regarded target by the experts, tends to be resilient by its own nature making cyber-attacks inefficient and ineffectual (Conway, 2011; Lewis, 2002; Wilson, 2005)


Brunst, P. W. (2008). Use of the internet by terrorists: A threat analysis. Responses to Cyber Terrorism, 34(1), 34–60.

Clarke, D. M. (2005). Human redundancy in complex, hazardous systems: A theoretical framework. Safety Science, 43(9), 655-677. doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2005.05.003

Computer hacking law & legal definition. (n.d.). US Legal. Retrieved from http://definitions.uslegal.com/c/computer-hacking/

Conway, M. (2011). Against cyberterrorism: Why cyber-based terrorist attacks are unlikely to occur. Communications of the ACM, 54(2), 26-28. doi:10.1145/1897816.1897829

Denning, D. (2006). A view of cyberterrorism five years later. In K. E. Himma (Ed.), Internet security: hacking, counterhacking, and society (pp. 123-139). Sudbury, MA: Jones and Bartlett.

Lewis, J. A. (2002, December). Assessing the risks of cyber terrorism, cyber war and other cyber threats. Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies. Retrieved from http://www.steptoe.com/publications/231a.pdf

Wilson, C. (2005, April 1). Computer attack and cyberterrorism: Vulnerabilities and policy issues for Congress (CRS Congressional report No. RL32114). Retrieved from http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA444799&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf

Immunization and Infectious Disease Mitigation

Cultural Models of Immunization and Infectious Disease Mitigation

The members of some communities, such as Puerto Rico, do not understand the scope and severity of some infectious diseases until they become infected (Pérez-Guerra, Zielinski-Gutierrez, Vargas-Torres, & Clark, 2009). The lack of a basic understanding of illness and infection poses a roadblock to mitigating disease transmission within the community. For Pérez-Guerra et al., the perception of severity and mitigation is important as they investigate the difference in attitudes towards dengue infections because dengue cannot be controlled by vaccine and must be mitigated by community participation in mosquito abatement activities. Other infectious diseases, however, can be controlled by vaccine, but efforts to limit infection are met with ignorance or misconceptions (Lau, Griffiths, Choi, & Tsui, 2010; Leask, Sheikh-Mohammed, MacIntyre, Leask, & Wood, 2006).

Public health officials, in concert with community leaders, should seek to educate affected communities about the infectious diseases they face along with effective mitigation strategies and the importance of vaccination, if available. Coreil (2010) describes the importance of cultural models in “[gaining] a deeper understanding of the cultural context of behavior” (p. 83). If behaviors are not understood, then it will be difficult to redirect them. Reaching out to community leaders has the added effect of allowing the leaders to alter the message just enough so that it might be effectively communicated to the community.

Providing a cultural health model allows for a larger scope of audience while effectively tailoring the message so that most of the target audience will appreciate the nature of the message. Approaching health behaviors from a cultural stand-point also offers the advantage of allowing peer support to propagate messages through out the community. This might be especially true when dealing with a multitude of subcultures where the message might better be disseminated via interpersonal means. Eventually, the message will be received by many individuals who will begin to have discussions with others in the community. For communities where individuals are not likely to speak to each other regarding personal health-related matters, the cultural health model allows a general message to reach each individual.


Coreil, J. (Ed.). (2010). Social and behavioral foundations of public health (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Lau, J. T. F., Griffiths, S., Choi, K. C., & Tsui, H. Y. (2010). Avoidance behaviors and negative psychological responses in the general population in the initial stage of the H1N1 pandemic in Hong Kong. BMC Infectious Diseases, 10(139), 1-13. doi:10.1186/1471-2334-10-139

Leask, J., Sheikh-Mohammed, M., MacIntyre, C. R., Leask, A., & Wood, N. J. (2006). Community perceptions about infectious disease risk posed by new arrivals: A qualitative study. The Medical Journal of Australia, 185(11/12), 591-593. Retrieved from http://www.mja.com.au/public/issues/185_11_041206/lea10999_fm.pdf

Pérez-Guerra, C. L., Zielinski-Gutierrez, E., Vargas-Torres, D., & Clark, G. G. (2009). Community beliefs and practices about dengue in Puerto Rico. Pan American Journal of Public Health, 25(3), 218-226. doi:10.1590/S1020-49892009000300005

Botulism: A Measurement of Occurrence

 Botulism, caused by the Clostridium botulinum bacterium, is typically caused by poorly prepared, home-canned foods and can cause symptoms as simple as blurred or double vision to full body paralysis, sometimes causing death (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 1996). The incidence of botulism is said to be extremely low with only 126 reported cases in the United States in 2003; with only eight attributable to foodborne vectors, the predominant cause is accidental contamination (CDC, 2004).

One of the concerns regarding botulism is its toxicity. Botulinum toxin is the most potent toxin known to man (CDC, 2006). This potency lends to botulinum’s ability to be used as an agent of bioterrorism, though most of the known cases have been shown to be accidental in nature (CDC, 1996; CDC, 2006). Another concern is the accidental or negligent contamination of any food prepared for wide distribution, such as canned vegetables from a large manufacturer.

Surveillance is important to identify each and every case in order to have the most accuracy possible when considering increasing or decreasing trends of incidence and prevalence of the disease. The cause of any increase or decrease in incidence of botulism should always be investigated.

Any increase of incidence could identify a possible problem while a decreased incidence could foretell efficacy in the efforts of mitigation. More appropriately, though, as Friis and Sellers (2009) show, further identification should be made in order to focus on specific descriptive factors, such as affected populations, the geography of these populations, known vectors, and factors of time. This process will ensure that more accurate trends are observed.

For instance, the CDC (2004) has stated that in a typical year, such as 2004, the incidence of botulism is less than 200. With incidence reporting covering the entire United States, increases or decreases in this crude number serve only to identify general changes in frequency; whereas, further identification of certain characteristics of the disease pattern will help to further isolate affected individuals and etiologies (Friis et al., 2009). Within the CDC’s (2004) data, infant occurrence of botulism is identified as the major contributor to incidence, thereby isolating the remaining occurrences to adults. The CDC has gone further to separate the incidences of botulism into three groups, infant occurrence, foodborne infection, and wound infection. A separate group is reserved for other occurrences relating to the use of pharmacological botulin.

Using descriptive factoring of the 2003 CDC data (2004), further geographic isolation of occurrences show that infant occurring botulism is fairly wide-spread with a small number of incidences in each of twenty-two States, though California and Pennsylvania account for about half of the reported infant occurrences. Foodborne and wound occurrences of botulism were isolated to Alaska, California, Colorado, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. Texas had the only two reportable cases classified as “Other”. Theoretical assumptions can now be used to show that the problem in Texas is resolved but should continue to be monitored, and food safety education projects should focus on home-canning in the western regions of the United States.

In conclusion, epidemiology is an important means of understanding and identifying causation and etiology, as well as preparing for mitigation and outbreak response. In this example of botulism, I have identified localization of the disease, common pathways of infection, or vectors, and means of helping to mitigate future occurrences of the disease. Botulism numbers are quite low, but dealing with other diseases of larger scale, grouping the data into useful subsets will assist in following the progression of the disease from outbreak to outbreak and in consideration of mitigation techniques employed.


Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. (1996). Botulism (Clostridium botulinum): 1996 case definition [CSTE Position Statement No. 09-ID-29]. Retrieved from http://www.cdc.gov/ncphi/disss/nndss/casedef/botulism_current.htm

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2004). Surveillance for Outbreaks of Botulism [Summary of 2003 Data]. Retrieved from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention website: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/files/Botulism_CSTE_2003.pdf

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U. S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2006). History of Bioterrorism: Botulism. CDC Emergency Preparedness and You [Podcast]. Washington, DC: CDC Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program.

Friis, R. H., & Sellers, T. A. (2009). Epidemiology for public health practice (4th ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Improving Traffic Safety for Emergency Responders

The Emergency Medical Services (EMS) is an occupational field wrought with opportunities for workers to become ill, injured, or succumb to death while performing the functions of their job (Maguire, Hunting, Smith, & Levick, 2002). In the mid-1980’s, Iglewicz, Rosenman, Iglewicz, O’Leary, and Hockmeier (1984) were among the first to perform research into the occupational health of EMS workers by uncovering unhealthy carbon monoxide levels in the work area. This appears to have been the impetus for further research into uncovering some of the causes and contributing factors of illness and injury incidents, as well as safer alternatives to current work practices.

One of the more recent efforts to protect EMS workers relates to traffic-related injuries and fatalities of EMS workers while responding to calls and working on the scenes of traffic accidents. As important it is for the EMS workers to be able to get to the scene of an emergency and work without threat of injury, the safety of the community is important to consider. Solomon (1990) realized the need to improve safety in this area and recommended changing the paint color of emergency apparatus to more visible lime-green. Emergency workers were continuing to fall victim to “secondary incidents” at roadway scenes (Cumberland Valley Volunteer Firemen’s Association, 1999). An analysis of EMS worker fatalities between 1992 and 1997 reveals an occupational fatality rate that continues to exceed that of the general population (Maguire, Hunting, Smith, & Levick, 2002).

Across the pond, in the United Kingdom, efforts were also underway to improve the visibility of police vehicles by considering various paint design schemes, including the Battenburg design: alternating blocks of contrasting colour (Harrison, 2004). Harrison concluded that the half-Battenburg design showed promise as it increased visibility and recognition of police cars in the United Kingdom, and the United States National Institute of Justice was considering research on the efficacy of the Battenburg design here in the United States to promote officer safety. EMS administrations are known for paying special attention to the bandwagon, that is they frequently make changes based on inconclusive and sporadic evidence. This is the case with recent ambulance designs.

Many ambulances in the New England, as well as other parts of the country, are being designed with the half-Battenburg markings applied to the sides of the vehicles in attempts to improve the safety of EMS workers. Unfortunately, we may find that these markings might have an unintended effect of confusing other drivers and causing more problems. A recent study found that Harrison (2004) was correct in that the Battenburg design assisted British drivers in quickly identifying British police vehicles, but the “effectiveness of the ‘Battenburg’ pattern in the UK appears primarily related to its association with police vehicles in that country” (Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security, 2009, p. 6) having little effect on the recognition potential of American drivers.

Perhaps with the evolving data, we can begin using an evidence-based approach at helping the EMS worker perform his or her job safely at traffic scenes.


Cumberland Valley Volunteer Firemen’s Association. (1999). Protecting Emergency Responders on the Highways: A White Paper. Emmitsburg, MD: United States Fire Administration.

Federal Emergency Management Agency, Department of Homeland Security. (2009). Emergency vehicle visibility and conspicuity study [Catalog No. FEMA FA-323]. Emmittsburg, MD: United States Fire Administration.

Harrison, P. (2004). High-conspicuity livery for police vehicles [Publication No. 14/04]. Hertfordshire, U.K.: Home Office, Police Scientific Development Branch. Retrieved from http://scienceandresearch.homeoffice.gov.uk/hosdb/publications/road-policing-publications/14-04-High-Conspicuity-Li12835.pdf

Iglewicz, R., Rosenman, K.D., Iglewicz, B., O’Leary, K., & Hockmeier, R. (1984). Elevated levels of carbon monoxide in the patient compartment of ambulances. American Journal of Public Health, 74(5).

Maguire, B.J., Hunting, K.L., Smith, G.S., and Levick, N.R. (2002). Occupational fatalities in emergency medical services: A hidden crisis. Annals of Emergency Medicine, 40(6), 625-632. doi: 10.1067/mem.2002.128681

Solomon, S.S. (1990). Lime-yellow color as related to reduction of serious fire apparatus accidents: The case for visibility in emergency vehicle accident avoidance. Journal of the American Optometric Association, 61, 827-831.

“Disaster Response and Management – IT” (DRAM-IT)

With the growing focus of disaster mitigation, response and recovery, companies that rely on information systems need to prevent and minimize the impact of disasters (whether natural or man-made) to their infrastructure. Society’s focus is to regain a sense of normalcy which requires a functioning economy, thereby increasing the need for companies to recover quickly.

By providing expert philosophies, procedures, systems and tools, DRAM-IT can ensure that the client will transition seamlessly from pre-disaster to post-disaster with no negative long-term effects.

We start with employee-focused health, safety and security. We believe that the employee is the first defense against failure. Employees should be healthy and not have their minds occupied by other domestic problems (e.g. family welfare) which is why in times of a disaster affecting the community, we contract with armed security agencies to provide force security for key employees and their families. This focus allows other employees to take care of their own before returning to work. The same security force will provide on-site perimeter security allowing employees to feel safe while aiding in recovery efforts. But, before the incident occurs, we will create processes to assist each employee in staying healthy and fit, both physically and mentally, including the creation of medical response teams to manage on-site medical emergencies until EMS can arrive.

Data loss can be immeasurable and therefore cannot be tolerated. After performing a forensic analysis of current IT practices, DRAM-IT will offer methods of securing data with redundant distributed arrays with cryptographic and hashing intelligence ensuring the data has not been and cannot be manipulated. Along with distributed storage, we can offer distributed processing to ensure the business keeps running without a need for direct input by employees.

During a disaster, the focus needs to be on initiating recovery processes and requires interfacing with local authorities to be part of the solution. We will provide the internal Incident Command structure which will integrate with the local, State, and Federal efforts to ensure pooling of resources. We are also committed to the community. The faster the individual entities of a community can recover, the faster the community as a whole can heal.

With DRAM-IT Systems Mitigation, Response and Recovery, we can ensure that you can concentrate on what is important… we’ll take care of the rest.

By providing an all-encompassing approach to disaster management, our clients can be assured of continuous critical systems processing, ensuring business continuity throughout the disaster.

Table Title: Examples of Structure and IT needs
Functional Area (See Figure 7.23) Supporting Information Systems (See Figure 1.6)
Example: Human Resource Management Example: Transaction Processing Systems
Command Executive Information Systems
Operations Decision Support & Strategic Info Systems
Tactical Knowledge Management & Expert Systems
Logistics Specialized / Transaction Control Systems
Finance Specialied / Transaction Control Systems

Subject: Investment Opportunity – “Disaster Response and Management – IT (DRAM-IT)” 02/25/14
To Whom it May Concern

I am writing you as an entrepreneur in support of the community. We have faced a number of disasters recently and our economy continuously suffers. I hope to provide a host of services to companies which are key to the community infrastructure. My goal is to be able to assist these key companies in recovering from the disaster internally and allowing the economy a maximized benefit in a minimal amount of time.

As a critical care paramedic who has worked with FEMA response teams in the past years, I have the experience and education to know what is crucially important during a disaster. As a computer programmer and IT professional, I know how to apply my knowledge to critical business systems ensuring a smooth transition during the various phases of a disaster, whether large or small, internal or external.

I wish to be able to provide mitigation training, on-site employee health programs, redundant communications, secure data storage and retrieval with distributive data processing, personal and protective security and adaptive processes and philosophies that can overcome even the most destructive of forces. We will initially be focused on consulting with the promotion of best-practices in mind. During the disaster phase, we will respond directly as Incident Command Teams that will be fully self-sufficient for over 72-hours to ensure the response and recovery are as smooth as possible.

The unfortunate reality is that this endeavor will require a large amount of start-up capital. We must first hire and train appropriate personnel who can then consult to client companies and ensure they can operate effectively during and after a disaster. We also need access to distributive networks with which to operate. These will undoubtedly be fee-based services, but initial investments of processor-time and storage would be invaluable. Investing in this opportunity is investing in the community.


Michael Schadone