All posts by Mike Schadone

Criminal Justice, Emergency Management, Politics, Society, Technology

Planning a Terrorist Attack

Planning a clandestine attack using a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) is not simple. First, in order to promote an attack, the target needs to be viewed to have violated some ideology, policy, or other deeply held belief (“Terrorism, definition and history of,” 2002). Usually, a symbol of the offense will be chosen as either a specific target, such as the case of the World Trade Center, or as a vehicle or vector for the attack, as in the case of the U.S. Postal Service anthrax attacks (“Biological terrorism,” 2002; Marshall, 2002; “Weapons of mass destruction,” 2002). The dollar is an international symbol of capitalism and the might of the United States. In the current climate, especially with the declining U.S. economy, I would expect the money supply, itself, to be a viable vector for disseminating some sort of substance capable of causing terror. A dollar bill has a circulating life of 42 months and changes hands, on average, twice a day, and by impregnating paper money with a chosen substance, a single dollar bill could potentially harm more than 2,500 people during its circulation (U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving, n.d.).

Almost as important as the vehicle is the impregnating substance. Chemical and radiological substances would be too easy to eventually detect, and the amount dispersed on each dollar bill might not be enough to cause harm. A live biological agent suspended in an aqueous nutrient solution could easily coat a dollar bill without detection and easily transfer to hands, surfaces, and other bills. According to Winfield and Groisman (2003), Salmonella enterica might prove to be a hardy pathogen capable of existing in such a solution for months. S. enterica is responsible for typhoid fever in humans. Escherichia coli, though a highly pathenogenic mycobacterium, does not have the same persistance outside of a living host. Both S. enterica and E. coli have detrimental health effects, especially for those with deficient immune systems.

Delivery and dispersion of the weapon would be the next consideration. This would have to be accomplished using a number of distribution points, geographically distant, that transfer small denomination bills easily both in and out, such as gasoline stations, convenience stores, fast food restaurants, and liquor stores. Using a website designed to track dollar bills (http://www.wheresgeorge.com), a single bill has been tracked in about two and a half years, as follows: Florida, Georgia, Florida, Indiana, Arizona, Oregon, New York, Tennessee, and South Carolina. Another has been documented as travelling from Ohio to Michigan via Kentucky, Tennessee, Florida, Texas, Louisiana, Texas, and Utah in a mere 212 days. This is evidence that general dispersion techniques will work well if initially geographically distributed.

Additionally, as the Salmonella bills are being dispersed, I would encourage a technological attack on various credit card networks. If the hacking results in increased network downtime, the American citizenry would be encouraged to use paper money more often, potentiating the transfer of the Salmonella bills. As a final coup de grace, when the American populace finally begin to realize that the money supply, itself, is tainted, I would encourage conventional attacks on banking institutions to include random bombings, shootings, and threats of the same. This would further drive the message against the U.S. money supply and could crash the economy.

This plan was developed in about twenty minutes. The terrorists of the day have had decades to consider such plans, and I for one am glad that they tend to be grandiose. When the terrorists realize the simplicity required of causing terror in the U.S., we need to be very wary.

References

Biological terrorism. (2002). Encyclopedia of terrorism. Retrieved from http://sage-ereference.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/view/terrorism/n76.xml

Marshall, P. (2002, February 22). Policing the borders. CQ Researcher, 12, 145-168. Retrieved from http://library.cqpress.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/cqresearcher/

Terrorism, definition and history of. (2002). Encyclopedia of terrorism. Retrieved from http://sage-ereference.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/view/terrorism/n415.xml

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Bureau of Engraving. (n.d.). FAQ library. Retrieved from http://www.moneyfactory.gov/faqlibrary.html

Weapons of mass destruction. (2002). Encyclopedia of terrorism. Retrieved from http://sage-ereference.com.ezp.waldenulibrary.org/view/terrorism/n453.xml

Winfield, M. D. & Groisman, E. A. (2003). Role of Nonhost Environments in the Lifestyles of Salmonella and Escherichia coli. Applied Environmental Microbiology, 69(7), 3687-3694. doi:10.1128/AEM.69.7.3687-3694.2003

Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services

Ethics and Decision Making During Critical Incidents

As a paramedic, I am faced with ethical decisions fairly frequently. As an example, I am usually the sole responding paramedic to an incident that might involve a number of seriously ill or injured patients (e.g. car accidents, fires, carbon monoxide). These incidents are challenging in that I have to choose which patient(s) will be treated at the higher level of care that I can provide versus the lower level of care that the basic life support units can provide. Typically, I base my decision merely on which patient is more ill or injured; however, many times I am faced with a number of critical patients and must decide based on ethical criteria, such as who would benefit more from my care in the long run, including the fact that adolescent and adult patients tend to fair better than elderly and infant patients (Broos, D’Hoore, Vanderschot, Rommens, & Stappaerts, 1993; Kypri, Chalmers, Langley, & Wrigh, 2000; McGwin, Melton, May, & Rue, 2000).

One of the problems with attempting to remain ethical while decisions during an emergency response is that the situational picture is almost never as clear as you need it. This is especially true as the scope and scale of the incident increases. As the magnitude of an incident grows, the incident command team become inundated with information, and it is common to be overwhelmed. We do, though, try our best to be just and fair in our determinations. We need to make our decisions based on the current information and not dwell on if they were right or wrong (Walsh et al., 2012), only if we could have approached the problem more effectively and efficiently, and this should be done only in the debriefing.

References

Broos, P. L. O., D’Hoore, A., Vanderschot, P., Rommens, P. M., & Stappaerts, K. H. (1993). Multiple trauma in elderly patients. Factors influencing outcome: importance of aggressive care. Injury, 24(6), 365-368. doi:10.1016/0020-1383(93)90096-O

Kypri, K., Chalmers, D. J., Langley, J. D., & Wrigh, C. S. (2000). Child injury mortality in New Zealand 1986–95. Journal of Paediatrics and Child Health, 36(5), 431–439. doi:10.1046/j.1440-1754.2000.00559.x

McGwin, G., Melton, S. M., May, A. K., & Rue, L. W. (2000). Long-term survival in the elderly after trauma. Journal of Trauma, Injury, Infection, & Critical Care, 49(3), 470-476.

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Politics

A Failure of Best Practices – A Critique

The incident that occurred on April 23rd at 0753 involving an explosion at a soda bottling plant was handled poorly by officials and the incident management team; however, this evaluation does not reflect the efforts of the rescue workers, themselves. Though the management of the incident was poorly thought out and implemented, the incident was brought under control within just a few hours.

The biggest problem to impact the response to this large incident was the failure of local, county, and state officials to prepare a plan to deal with incidents of this type and scope. Once rescue officials were informed of the incident, a plan had to be constructed and implemented. This delayed rescue, firefighting, evacuation, and containment efforts. Also, logistics were negatively impacted by not having predesignated resources identified to respond on a contingency basis (Walsh et al., 2012). All supplies and specialized resources needed to be sought during the active incident response. This took valuable time and delayed efforts. Further, evacuations were not planned for and resulted in public confusion and unwarranted distress that complicated the overall evacuation effort (Walsh et al., 2012).

In addition, planning was negatively impacted by a number of other failures, including the loss of cellular communications which was detrimental to the situational picture. A further planning failure allowed the weather to change dramatically without forewarning to the rest of the incident management team. This drastic misstep resulted in a loss of incident control and was detrimental to firefighting efforts (Walsh et al., 2012).

However, the most telling feature of this incident is the incident management team member who left his post in dereliction to attend to his family. This action only served to cause alarm amongst the other team members and required staffing augmentations that took time away from actual management of the incident (Walsh et al., 2012).

These failures, among others, manifest themselves as added difficulty to an already complex incident. Lives may have been jeopardized, as well as the health of the public as evidenced by the surge in emergency room visits in the months following the incident (Walsh et al., 2012).

Though there were mistakes made, some features of this incident are to be lauded. First, mutual aid agreements allowed for a multi-jurisdictional response across five counties, including state resources. Though these resources were hampered in large part by the failures in preplanning and mitigation, they did succeed in controlling the incident in just a few hours, facing poor weather conditions and prolonged extrication of trapped victims.

According to Walsh et al. (2012), responders at every level and in every capacity need to be involved in preparation, mitigation, training, exercising, evaluation, and improvement of response efforts. By having an updated plan in place that all responders are familiar with and integrating a unified incident management effort, most large scale incidents can be resolved systematically without any further threat to lives or property. Responders need to be prepared and capable to handle all emergencies, large and small.

References

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Emergency Management, Politics, Society

Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned

The primary and causative failure of government, according to the U.S. House report (2006), was that officials did not develop an adequate or accurate situational picture in a timely fashion. This lead to minimal preparation, ineffective evacuation plans, and an slow logistical supply chains for moving needed assets into the area to aid with the response. The second mistake, according to the report, was officials distancing themselves from the failures politically. This sole act (by many in the leadership) served only to protract the response and recovery and confuse the populace. Understandably, however, the politicians certainly wanted to be removed from the situation, as they could have lessened the burden years earlier with use of specific appropriations. Funds designed to mitigate the exposure of the Gulf coast to hurricanes were not spent as intended, if at all.

Looking back on the situation, had each government activated their EOC and staffed it with reputable public safety officials to run the response, the situational picture would have been clearer, especially with the various EOCs communicating together (Walsh et al., 2012). The plan might have coalesced into the use of an area command with resources deployed in task force and strike team convention as needed. Certainly, though, the public message would have been singular, to the point, and helpful to the public (Walsh et al., 2012). This would have lead to an expedited response and coordinated evacuations prior to landfall of Hurricane Katrina, which was said to be “predicted with unprecedented timeliness and accuracy” (U.S. House of Representatives, 2006, ix).

References

U.S. House of Representatives. (2006). A failure of initiative: Final report of the select bipartisan committee to investigate the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Criminal Justice, Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Politics, Public Health

Critical Incident Leadership

The skills needed to lead and manage an incident within the command structure of an incident management team are broad and far-reaching. Though individual skills, traits, or attributes are not particular enough to manifest leadership (Zaccaro, Kemp, & Bader, 2004), two important skills that I have identified from my experience and from the text of Walsh et al. (2012), one of which I possess and the other could be enhanced or improved, are a wide breadth of acquired knowledge of the particular spheres of public safety, including operations of emergency and normalcy, and a particular political will that endeavors to ensure favor from most subordinates while carrying out the capacity of management (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008).

Of the latter, I could certainly appreciate a need to remain favored and liked throughout the management of an emergent incident; however, the respect that is earned by the end of any successfully managed crisis is worth more to me than blind politicking, and I have no use for elected office unless that office has a use for me. I do understand how, if I managed to cultivate my political will, it might be easier to find resources and more willing accomplices to alleviate the tasks at hand, though I still wrestle with the notion of neighbors owing neighbors in times of emergent crisis.

To speak of the former is to identify acquired skill and knowledge that I can portray in solid foundation. Having been trained by some of the leaders in the field of disaster management as a member of their team, in both leadership and subordinate roles, I have the confidence to direct subordinates to the task at hand safely and efficiently while being directed or counseled (however my office might fall within a command structure). More important than being knowledgeable, though, is knowing when you require more knowledge. I am never afraid or apprehensive of my limitations, and I will always ask for assistance when needed.

It is interesting to discuss the traits and abilities needed by leaders in order to lead (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008; Walsh et al., 2012); however, none of the literature can substantiate that any one particular trait or skill is particular to or required by a leader, or that it is found lacking in a follower (Zaccaro, Kemp, & Bader, 2004). So long as I am willing to take charge when needed and have the necessary knowledge to direct appropriate actions, I feel that I will continue to perform well in command positions, that is, until someone more adept avails themselves to the task.

References

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January). National response framework. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Zaccaro, S. J., Kemp, C., & Bader, P. (2004). Leader traits and attributes. In J. Antonakis, A. T. Cianciolo, & R. J. Sternberg (Eds.), The nature of leadership (pp. 101-124). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Health Care, Politics, Public Health, Society

Critical Incident Response Plans

The possibility of a large-scale event threatening the health and safety of a large number of residents in Connecticut is sizable. Emergency response plans (ERPs) need to be in place to address concerns including epidemic/pandemic disease, the intentional or accidental release of a hazardous material, contamination of the food and/or water supply, and other incidents that might threaten the 3.4 million residents and could result in mass casualties. For this reason, the State of Connecticut Department of Public Health (DPH; 2005) has developed an ERP to guide the department in the event of a catastrophic threat the lives and safety of the residents of Connecticut. Additionally, the State of Connecticut has developed a State Response Framework, much like the National Response Framework, in order to allow for a modulation of an incident from a local level to a state or federal level (State of Connecticut, Department of Homeland Security, 2010; U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008). The ability of an incident response to grow and shrink as an incident dictates follows the natural progression of incidents starting and ending locally, whether involving state or local responses at any time during the response (Walsh et al., 2012).

The ERP (DPH, 2005) that guides the DPH allows for representation in the state EOC while forming a modular incident management team (IMT) to staff the DPH emergency command center. The DPH IMT is designed not only to support the state EOC when activated, but also supports the various local incident commands as a public health and medical service resource. In keeping with the modular aspects of the incident command philosophies and the state and national response framework, the DPS ERP becomes a valuable resource for both initiating a response to a significant threat to the public health and safety and allows for an expert resource when other incidents of magnitude, but not necessarily public health in nature, require or benefit from the availability of public health experts.

One criticism I do have, however, is that the plan (DPH, 2005) does not address the provision of emergency medical services (EMS). For some time, there has been much confusion as to where EMS falls in the realm of emergency service functions. EMS, for many jurisdictions, is a function of the fire department and may fall under the direction of ESF #4, firefighting, especially as many EMTs and paramedics are cross-trained to fight fire. However, ambulances are not firefighting apparatus. As ambulances do transport the ill and injured, perhaps EMS falls to ESF #1, transportation. This is unlikely, though, as the primary need is not the transportation provided but the care rendered. Public health and medical services, ESF #8, seems to me to be the logical category for EMS to fall under, but EMS has an expanded role that also fits ESFs #9, #10 & #13 (search & rescue, oil & hazmat response, and public safety & security, respectively), as well as the aforementioned ESFs #1 and 4. This lack of initial categorization may allow flexibility in the deployment of EMS personnel and equipment, but it could also lead to ineffective deployment strategies resulting in a shortage of EMS in one area and overutilization in another.

References

State of Connecticut, Department of Homeland Security. (2010, October). State response framework. Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/telecommunications/ct_state_response_framework_v1_oct_10.pdf

State of Connecticut, Department of Public Health. (2005, September). Public health emergency response plan: Emergency Support Function #8 Public health and medical services. Retrieved from http://www.ct.gov/ctfluwatch/lib/ctfluwatch/pherp.pdf

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008, January). National response framework. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Health Care, Politics

Emergency Operations Center Leadership

The emergency operations center (EOC) is a decentralized and secure place for senior management officials to maintain operational awareness when confronted with a large scale events or disasters (Walsh et al., 2012). Although these events or disasters may dictate the use of local incident commands at various emergencies throughout an area, the EOC allows an incident management team to direct the overall response effort while maintaining complete situational awareness. This allows for increased interoperability and the availability of resources and a centralized planning and intelligence effort (Walsh et al., 2012). During a multi-state event, a joint field office (JFO) might serve as the primary EOC to support other EOCs that have been activated.

Within the EOC, there are a number of leaders and managers responsible for ensuring an effective response strategy for the emergency that is being faced. One of these leaders is the Area Command Logistics Section Chief (or, “Log Chief”). The Log Chief is responsible for procuring and otherwise acquiring the facilities and personnel to support the response initiative. This includes “resources from off-incident locations […] providing facilities, transportation, supplies, equipment maintenance and fuel, food services, communications and information technology support, and emergency responder medical services, including innoculations” (Walsh et al., 2012, p. 60).

In response to an impending an ice storm in Austin, Texas, in 2003, the city’s EOC was activated 24 hours in advance of the storm. One of the crucial area command members activated was the Log Chief. The Log Chief ensured that redundant communications facilities were available as power outages were interferring with some established communications equipment. The Log Chief also ensured that there was food available for delivery to each small-scale incident as it developed. This was important as the available resources were deployed, there was a lack of available manpower during shift change, so feeding hungry crews was a priority. The Log Chief, on this incident, had many other important functions, but as a responder working in these adverse conditions, it was most important for me to be fed and have solid communications in the event I was to be one of the motorists sliding off the road.

References

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Emergency Management, Politics

Emergency Operations Center: EOC Coordination

The Emergency Operations Center (EOC) Coordinator is responsible for “[setting up the] facility, [providing] available supplies, communications and other equipment, and [monitoring] communications flow through FAX and email [, as well as] establishes and manages a system of EOC and field runners, and manages the check-in area for EOC staff [and] provides assistance to the EOC Director as necessary” (University of Alaska, Anchorage, 2008, p. 9). The EOC Coordinator supports the function of the EOC but is not directly involved in the decision-making processes of the incident management team. The most important function of the EOC Coordinator, however, is to ensure that all lines of communication to and from the EOC are operating correctly and have redundancy in place, usually in the form of low-tech ham radio operation teams (Walsh et al., 2012).

In this scenario (Laureate Education, Inc., n.d.), a bomb was activated in a train station and a request for additional coordination was made by the local incident commander. In order to minimize the loss of life and property, the EOC Coordinator should ensure that the EOC is ready for mobilization (Walsh et al., 2012). Three important steps towards this goal are 1) ensuring all avenues of communication, whether technical or analog, are functioning properly, 2) ensuring all network and computer terminals are functional with appropriate redundancies (i.e. whiteboards, poster paper, etc.), and 3) ensuring food and beverage stocks are adequate for three 24-hour operational periods, which would allow enough time for the Logistics Section to arrange catering as needed.

The goals of the EOC Coordinator are to ensure that the EOC is ready to support the operational needs of the incident command structure. The goal of the incident command system is to respond to and deal with actual emergencies. There are times, however, that the emergencies will be so encompassing that the current continuity of government (whether local, state, or federal) will be threatened. It is the function of the EOC Coordinator to ensure that there are clear lines of communication to government officials off-site, as well as clearly written orders of succession available on-site, in the case of catastrophic governmental failure. There also needs to be clearly documented continuity plans located on-site involving facilities, communications, and delegation of authority in the event of EOC failure or separation from governmental control (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2008a, 2008b; Walsh et al., 2012).

In addressing this scenario, it has occurred to me that, although the federal government has directed the use of common language, titles, and job descriptions, many still confuse the functions of NIMS. The EOC Coordinator and the EOC Director are frequently confused with each other, yet they are clearly two separate job titles with two unique and important functions. These functions are also frequently confused with the unified command structure that may use the EOC from time to time to manage small local multi-agency incidents.

References

Laureate Education, Inc. (n.d.). Critical incidents and cross-agency coordination: North metro rail line scenario [media]. Retrieved from http://mym.cdn.laureate-media.com/2dett4d/Walden/CRJS/4302/03/mm/metrorailscenario/index.html

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008a, January). National response framework. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf

U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (2008b, February). Federal continuity directive 1 (FCD 1): Federal executive branch national continuity program and requirements. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/offices/fcd1.pdf

University of Alaska, Anchorage. (2008, April). Emergency operations plan. Retrieved from http://www.uaa.alaska.edu/facultyservices/upload/UAA-Emergency-Operations-Plan.pdf

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Politics, Public Health

Unified Command and Cross-Agency Conflicts

Each and every day I am faced with incidents that involve a number of different agencies. A simple car crash, for example, can involve two police departments, two fire departments, three emergency medical basic life support services, and two emergency medical advanced life support services, yet we never use unified command, merely single command. Having been trained in ICS and incident management with a focus on unified command structures, it is disheartening to see my local responders attempt to manage incidents without this useful and effective facet. According to Walsh et al. (2012), responders frequently face incidents where multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions are involved, and frequent use of unified command during incidents of smaller scale creates a familiarity which allows for seamless scalability when the need for a robust command structure presents itself.

A recent house fire brought this to the forefront of my mind. We had six fire departments, an emergency medical basic life support service, the state police, and two fire investigators onscene. We had one incident commander (the Chief of the jurisdictional department), no EMS command or law enforcement command, and no subordinate structure. The incident commander quickly found himself burdened with every detail of the incident and no one to help to alleviate the burden. Additionally, the incident commander (the only person who has detailed knowledge about the incident thus far) is finding himself walking in and around the fire building. If anything devastating happens, such as an explosion or toxic release, the entirety of command would be compromised and a whole command structure would have to be developed from scratch. More importantly, however, is the potential for conflict in determining who is ultimately in charge of each operational group (i.e. emergency medical services without an EMS command) or operational period, such as might occur in protracted incidents. Turf wars are notorious amongst public safety agencies, and planning the roles and responsibilities of each prior to responding to incidents can go a long way in preventing this conflict and confusion.

Compare the above with how we would approach almost every incident when I worked for the city of Austin, Texas. In Austin, we relied heavily on the unified command approach to incident management. For any motor vehicle accident, house fire, technical rescue, or any other multi-agency response, we would establish fire command, EMS command, and law enforcement command (depending on the involvement of each agency). At the least, law enforcement would plug in to the command structure as an operational branch. We would always establish a command, and if the incident warranted, we would build the command structure in top-down fashion starting with operations. Many incidents in Austin did, in fact, have pre-plans established that each agency was well versed in and trained on often. This allowed for rapid mitigation of any unforeseen circumstances that might occur. Additionally, the command post was always removed from the scene enough to prevent the command structure from succumbing to the effects (whether physical hazards or emotional) of the incident scene. In this paradigm, there is always a superior to represent the interests of each agency and guide their members safely and effectively through the incident.

There are many methods of effectively responding to and managing incidents, and many of these methods work most of the time; however, best practices, as described in Walsh et al. (2012), are designed to ensure effective and efficient incident management as well as maintain operational security and safety.

References

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.

Emergency Management, Emergency Medical Services, Politics, Public Health, Technology

National Incident Management System

The National Incident Management System [NIMS] is a dynamic continuum of interrelated processes designed to allow for the systematic response to any incident, large or small, using standardized practices that transcend political and geographical boundaries and can be adopted easily without regard to specialty or professional focus (U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA], n.d.; Walsh et al., 2012). The five component philosophies of NIMS are:

  1. preparedness,
  2. communications and information management,
  3. resource management,
  4. command and management, and
  5. ongoing management and maintenance.

I have not included ‘supporting technologies’ as a component of NIMS merely because it is supportive in both description and function.

Supporting technologies are used to further enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of NIMS by providing tools that help to streamline processes (Walsh et al., 2012). Supporting technologies has to be the least important on the list as it can be used to facilitate each of the others, but the effectiveness of NIMS is not contingent on this component.

The strongest, or most important component, is arguably preparedness. Kirkwood (2008) outlines the importance of training when dealing with large and small events across multiple jurisdictions and demonstrates how preparing for the eventuality of an emergency allows for a greater degree of critical thinking without the burden of the emergency, itself. However, as NIMS is a continuum of systems and processes, each of the five components is strikingly important to the others and can be either complimentary or detrimental in the end.

References

Kirkwood, S. (2008). NIMS and ICS: from compliance to competence. EMS Magazine, 37(2), 51-2, 54-7. Retrieved from http://www.emsresponder.com/

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency. (n.d.). NIMS FAQ. Retrieved from http://www.fema.gov/emergency/nims/FAQ.shtm

Walsh, D. W., Christen, H. T., Callsen, C. E., Miller, G. T., Maniscalco, P. M., Lord, G. C., & Dolan, N. J. (2012). National Incident Management System: principles and practice (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.